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Policy Convergence and Divergence 
The aim of this paper is to assess the potential for, and degree of, policy convergence and 
divergence in Scotland after devolution. Divergence is measured by reference to two 
comparators: Scottish policy before devolution; and contemporary policy pursued in 
England. Of course, public policy is a notoriously slippery concept, and a difficult one to 
operationalize and measure. It is the product of numerous influences at various spatial 
and functional levels. Policy as designed at one level may change in the process of 
implementation at other levels. The focus here is the Scottish level and the extent to 
which the new institutions at that level have made distinct policy choices. 
Implementation is an important question, but not part of this research. The study of policy 
impact must also wait until it is possible to assess the effects of changes since 1999.    
   Policy might diverge at a number of levels and in more or less fundamental ways. The 
most radical would result from the identification of different issues, producing a distinct 
policy agenda in Scotland. Less radically, the same issues might be identified but defined 
and framed differently. Then issues might be defined the same way, but different policies 
adopted. Least radically, the same policies might be adopted, but delivered using 
different instruments, which might give scope for differential implementation or to 
benefit slightly different client groups. In practice, differences between policies shade 
into differences in degree within policies. The argument here is that devolution has meant 
a shift within this continuum from the latter to the former and thus an enlargement of the 
scope of policy making in Scotland. 
   The article first looks at the setting for policy making in Scotland, including the 
historical legacy, the context of the modern welfare state, and the division of 
responsibilities between Scottish, UK and European levels. It then examines the political 
factors, including policy communities, public opinion and political parties and the extent 
to which they are creating a distinct policy demand.  Next we look at the capacity of the 
Scottish Executive to make its own policy. The final section looks at policy divergence in 
practice, as evidenced by the first five years of the new devolved institutions. 
 
The Historical Legacy 
Contemporary studies of public policy are most often cast in a ‘new institutionalist’ 
frame. This recognizes the importance of institutions in framing behaviour and policy 
choices and could lead us to expect that constitutional change should have policy 
consequences. On the other hand, new institutionalism also emphasizes continuities, path 
dependency and the role both of old formal institutions and of ingrained practices (HALL 
and TAYLOR, 1996; STEINMO, THELEN and LONGSTRETH, 1992). Devolution and 
regional government in the other important European cases, Spain, Italy and Belgium, 
represented the insertion of a new territorial level into a previously centralized, 
functionally organized systems of government.1   While this represented a significant 
political change, the weight of centralized institutions, personnel and practices has 
constrained the policy making of devolved governments (SUBIRATS and GALLEGO, 
2002; DE RYNCK, 2002; BALME ET AL, 1994; ISSiRFA, 2003; NEGRIER AND 
JOUVE, 1998).  
                                                
1 I do not include France, which has only executive and not legislative devolution, or Germany, which has 
been federal since the foundation of the state. Devolution is the transformation of a unitary state.  
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   Scotland, by contrast, started from a tradition of administrative decentralization, in 
which large areas of domestic policy making were the responsibility of the Scottish 
Office and its associated agencies. There are contrasting judgements on of the 
significance of this. KELLAS (1984) wrote of a Scottish political system, able to take 
authoritative decisions. PATERSON (1994) argued that, at least until the 1980s, Scotland 
had enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, through its administrative agencies and distinct 
civil society. MOORE and BOOTH (1989) asserted that there was a form of meso-
corporatism in Scotland, in which government and interest groups produced a ‘negotiated 
order’. Others observers, however, emphasized the centralist nature of the British state, 
arguing that the Scottish Office was there to put a Scottish face on British policy. If there 
was divergence, it concerned the instruments rather than the ends of policy, how things 
were done rather than what was done (ROSS, 1981; KEATING and MIDWINTER, 1982; 
MIDWINTER, KEATING and MITCHELL, 1991; KEATING, 2001). Significant 
changes from the British policy line required clearance from Cabinet and, if there were 
any financial implications, from the Treasury (KEATING and CARTER, 1987). 
Administrative devolution, the presence of Scottish ministers in London and the limited 
parliamentary time for Scottish affairs did, however, mean that Scottish policy making 
was more insulated from local political pressures than was the case in England. Those 
Scottish groups that had carved out a niche within the system of administrative 
devolution enjoyed an insider status, but others found it difficult to penetrate. 
Governments had little fear of being defeated on Scottish issues, since this would require 
a rebellion of English backbenchers. As a result, central government policy could be 
imposed more easily than in England even on sensitive matters like local government 
reform. All the major initiatives of the 1979-97 Conservative governments were applied 
in Scotland; the poll tax was even pioneered there and only abandoned after massive 
protests in London. 2 
   If this analysis is correct, then devolution thus represents a twofold shift in influence. 
Power is transferred from London to Edinburgh; and within Scotland from the old policy 
networks to a broader and more pluralist policy community. The formal arrangements for 
devolution open up the prospect of such a shift. Scottish powers are defined broadly, 
excluding only those explicitly reserved for Westminster, allowing the Scottish 
Parliament and Executive broad scope in deciding both what to do and how to do it. 
Legislative devolution is paralleled by administrative division, based on the old Scottish 
Office, so that there are, in most policy fields, no overarching British or UK departments 
and Whitehall ministers cannot interfere in devolved matters. On the other hand, we 
know from experience of federal and devolved systems of government that formal 
autonomy does not necessarily lead to real power to make distinct policy. We need to 
take into account a range of contextual, political and institutional factors.  
 
Context 
Devolution has taken place within a complex, modern welfare state embedded in the 
European Union and a global free trading order, which imposes considerable constraints 
on policy differentiation. Firstly, the UK single market limits actions that might hinder 
the free movement of goods, services and labour, or constrain market competition. This is 
                                                
2 The reverse appears to be true now, as Scottish MPs are used to push through English legislation, 
overcoming internal dissent in the Labour Party in England.  
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reflected in the provisions for devolved industrial policy, which prevent Scotland 
engaging in unfair subsidization; provisions under European law have the same effect. 
Secondly, the welfare state settlement is based on notions of universal entitlement 
irrespective of place of residence. This is a political principle derived from a notion of 
‘social citizenship’ which is still seen as essentially British. It is also a practical matter of 
controlling ‘welfare migration’ in which individuals move in search of better services, 
penalizing jurisdictions that offer more generous terms. Generally speaking, the Scottish 
Parliament has control over services in kind delivered territorially, rather than cash 
transfers delivered to persons, but already issues have arisen as to entitlement to various 
benefits. Should such differentiation increase, we may see the development of a form of 
Scottish social citizenship defined by entitlements, overlaying British citizenship, but it is 
not clear that the British political parties are ready for this. Thirdly, there is a common 
security area, limiting the extent to which law and order and policing matters can in 
practice diverge within Great Britain (although they do in Northern Ireland). These 
factors would suggest that differences in policy are likely to be matters of degree and 
scope, rather than radically different conceptions of the main policy fields of economic 
management, welfare and security. In fact some of these factors now extend beyond the 
state, to the European level, and apply to the UK government as well as the Scottish 
Parliament, if not in such a constraining way.  
   On the other hand, the modern state also shows tendencies to differentiation and 
complexity. Macro-economic management may be a matter for the state, Europe and 
global trading regimes, but economic development and adaptation is increasingly seen as 
a local and regional matter. Regional and devolved governments are under intense 
pressure to adapt to the conditions of European and global competition, but they are not 
powerless in shaping their response (KEATING, LOUGHLIN AND DESCHOUWER, 
2003). Development strategies are differentiated according to the social and political 
structure of particular places, and there is a wide consensus they require refined and 
sensitive policies best managed by decentralized agencies. Similarly, the broad principles 
of the welfare state may be consistent across the state, but policies for social inclusion are 
now seen as best handled in the local context, where particular conditions can be taken 
into account and policy instruments mixed and co-ordinated. Policies on law and order 
can similarly be localized in new ways of addressing questions of delinquency or 
treatment of offenders, even while the broad coverage of law is the same. Experience 
with other federal and devolved systems suggests that, within shared assumptions about 
the role of the state in social and economic policy, there is room for experimentation and 
innovation. All this suggests that policy divergence might be a matter of degree rather 
than nature, but that its scope should be greater under devolution.  
 
Shared Responsibilities and Intergovernmental Policy Making 
Like other devolutionary and federal schemes, the Scotland Act  produces three types of 
competence: reserved, devolved and shared.3 Powers devolved to Scotland are very 
extensive compared with most devolved or even federal systems, with the notable 
absence of fiscal autonomy. In mature federal systems such as Germany or devolved 
systems like Italy and Spain, the shared category is quite large and is managed by 
                                                
3 This is the effect although, technically, only the reserved powers are specified. 
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negotiation between devolved or federated, and central or federal departments.  Often the 
central level will pass framework laws within which the devolved units must operate. UK 
devolution has relatively few shared powers and there is an absence of framework laws, 
with some exceptions like economic development, where the Scottish Executive operates 
within broad parameters set by Westminster and Brussels. This is more like the Belgian 
system, which tries to avoid shared competences (BRASSINE, 1994).  
   On the other hand, there is a large degree of interdependency between devolved and 
reserved powers. Transport policy is divided in a complicated way. Initially, railways and 
air transport were reserved while road transport was devolved. Later the Scottish 
Executive gained responsibility for franchises and subsidies for rail services contained 
within Scotland, enabling it to plan rail and road policy together but raising problems 
about the relationship between rail services (devolved) and rail regulation and the 
network (reserved). Inevitably, the Scottish Executive has taken an interest in air 
transport and airports, although only the airports in the Highlands and Islands (regarded 
as an essential social service) are devolved. There is a resulting tendency, which has also 
been noted in other systems, for central agencies to pass down costs to the devolved 
government, so that the Scottish Executive is carrying a substantial burden for improving 
the rail infrastructure.  
   Welfare state matters are divided between the Scottish and UK levels, with Scotland 
largely responsible for social services and London for cash payments, but the interface 
between the two creates areas of shared responsibility. Further interdependencies are 
created by new, transversal policy initiatives, responses to new problems or new ways of 
framing social questions. So, as labour market policy has been linked to welfare policy  
and to social services in the effort to get people into work, both levels of government 
have had to work together. This is visible in the New Deal initiative, which cuts across 
devolved and reserved functions. The broader social inclusion agenda, the focus on rural 
affairs, or the theme of ‘environmental justice’ are other transversal policy issues, 
requiring a co-ordinated approach not only across Scottish Executive departments but 
among the various levels of government, European, UK, Scottish and local, as well as the 
voluntary and private sectors. There is also a general concern, reflected in the devolution 
White Papers and legislation, that devolved governments should not upset UK policies in 
reserved areas and should adhere to European regulations.  
   This imposes a large degree of intergovernmental policy making. While this is common 
to multilevel systems of government, the UK again stands out in its degree of asymmetry, 
and in the fact that the UK government doubles up as the domestic government of 
England. Whitehall departments are sometimes predominantly English, where their 
responsibilities correspond to devolved powers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
for example the Department for Education and Skills or the Department of Health; 
although in legislative matters, these are English and Welsh. In other cases, they are 
predominantly UK departments, like the Foreign Office, Department  of Work and 
Pensions or Department of Defence. A third category is mixed, with some functions 
applying only in England, others in England and Wales, others to Great Britain and yet 
others to the United Kingdom; a prime example is the Home Office. The result can be 
seen from two perspectives. We could say that, in policy fields like education or 
agriculture, there is no ‘central government’, merely a group of territorial departments for 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, co-ordinating where necessary on 
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common issues. Alternatively, we could argue that there is a centre and that it is England, 
whose government and departments dominate and lead the policy process, to which the 
other administrations must adapt. There is in fact some truth in both perspectives.4 The 
result is a certain policy drag, as the devolved administrations are pulled along by 
initiatives from England. 
   Intergovernmental policy making is further complicated by the European Union, many 
of whose responsibilities correspond to devolved matters in Scotland. This imposes a 
two-fold loss of power, as Brussels regulates for devolved matters, and as the UK 
government re-enters devolved fields to present a single negotiating position in the 
Council of Ministers. Again, this is found in other federal and devolved systems, where 
the response has been to secure guarantees for the lower tier, both ‘upstream’ in the 
making of EU policy, and ‘downstream’ in its application. German and Austrian Länder 
and Belgian regions and communities  have guaranteed rights of participation and even to 
lead their national delegations to the Council of Ministers. In the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, the regions gained a subsidiarity clause intended to protect their 
competences  from undue European intrusion. Scotland has relied on a non-statutory 
Concordat and on political  relations between the Scottish Executive and the Westminster 
government (BULMER ET AL., 2002). In fact, the position has been carried over largely 
unchanged from the days of the Scottish Office and the Scottish line so far has been to 
cleave closely to the UK position, remaining an insider to the UK networks and 
depending on the weight of the United Kingdom to protect  Scottish interests. Some 
divergences, however, have emerged between the UK and the Scottish position on 
fisheries and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. Scotland has been active in the 
movement of the European ‘legislative regions’, although they gained little out of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. There are unresolved issues over how far Scotland 
would be able to apply the scope for variation in implementation of EU regulations that is 
given to ‘national’ governments in order to create variation within the United Kingdom. 
There is some interest in exploring the idea of  tripartite partnerships which the 
Commission is pioneering to give regions greater leeway in adapting European policies.  
   Intergovernmental policy-making in the United Kingdom is not highly institutionalized. 
There are Concordats to govern the relations between Scottish and Whitehall 
departments, and a series of Joint Ministerial Committees, but these are little used in 
practice (HOUSE OF LORDS, 2002). There is, instead, a reliance on informal 
mechanisms at civil service and ministerial levels, and on party political contacts. This 
resembles the arrangements in Spain or Belgium more than those in Germany or Canada. 
Given the highly partisan nature of British politics, these informal practices could hardly 
survive the presence on different parties in power in London and Edinburgh, and we 
would then need a different set of mechanisms.  
 
Policy Communities 
Scotland has always had its own interest groups, some of which emerged separately by 
historical accident, others in response to administrative devolution and need for 
interlocutors with the Scottish Office. In other cases, there are Scottish branches of UK or 
                                                
4 Further confusion is added when Scottish MPs are appointed to UK departments dealing predominantly 
with England, as in the case of John Reid, made Secretary of State for Health in 2003, on the grounds that 
any MP can serve in any ‘UK department’. 
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British groups. Devolution has led to a strengthening of this Scottish level, and a general 
grant of formal autonomy corresponding to the division of competences within 
government.  More officials have been appointed to engage in policy work and 
parliamentary liaison.5 There has  been a corresponding reduction in contact between 
Scottish groups and Whitehall, as they have used the Scottish Executive as the main point 
of access, even some times on reserved matters; the Scotland Office, now absorbed in the 
Department of Constitutional Affairs, is little used. Less expected, perhaps, is the relative 
lack of direct contact with Europe, which some groups before devolution had seen as an 
alternative outlet for their lobbying. Now there is a tendency to leave this to their UK 
counterparts, and work through them. Beyond these generalizations, we can detect some 
patterns in interest articulation and lobbying strategies. Big business, often externally 
owned, operating in global markets and regulated at UK and European levels, still 
privileges its relationships with London, while small businesses are more focused on the 
Scottish level and dependent on the public goods produced by the devolved 
administration.  Trade unions have traditionally been able to operate at  both the Scottish 
and the UK level. The Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC), voicing distinct Scottish 
concerns, is quite separate from the Trades Union Congress (TUC), which covers the 
whole United Kingdom. Since devolution, the Scottish level of policy making has been 
reinforced in some unions, and the STUC has established a clearer conception of its role, 
concentrating on devolved matters while leaving reserved matters to the TUC. The 
voluntary sector has expanded following devolution, and become more involved in policy 
matters, encouraged by the presence of the Scottish Parliament and the new mechanisms 
of consultation. This has increased the amount of interest group activity in Scotland and 
its pluralism. One measure is the 54 groups that produced their own manifesto of items to 
be addressed by the parties at the 2003 Scottish elections.  
   Devolution has strengthened the Scottish political arena, since the Scottish Parliament  
and Executive have such substantial powers that no groups can afford to ignore them 
entirely or by-pass them by going straight to London. This makes a contrast with the 
English regions, where participation in the regional machinery is voluntary and groups 
that are discontented can walk away. In turn, this has produced a social dialogue in 
Scotland, in which groups, being in the same political arena, must address each other’s 
concerns and gain a degree of political legitimacy. This effect is not to be exaggerated. 
Scotland is still not the level at which the main social compromises are made, and big 
business is still much more UK-oriented than is the voluntary sector, but it does affect the 
political agenda in Scotland.  
    There are still big differences in the extent to which policy communities operate at UK 
or Scottish levels. Primary and secondary education are debated within a Scottish 
framework among Scottish actors, as was largely the case before devolution. Big business 
is used to operating on a UK basis and still does. Universities, on the other hand, are used 
to operating in a highly articulated UK policy community, but have to adapt to a new 
dispensation. The 2003 White Paper on Higher Education in England has become a 
reference point for debate within Scotland, although it does not apply there. Where 
groups operate on both sides of the border, there is also something of an imitation effect, 
as those who complain about being treated worse demand parity.  Business groups have 
                                                
5 79 interviews were conducted with representatives of interest groups in Scotland, most of whom were 
interviewed in 1999-2000 and again in 2003-4.  
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regularly complained about higher business rates in Scotland (although a proper 
comparison would have to take into account differences in rateable value).  
   Interest groups in all sectors have found it difficult to make the transition from lobbying 
for a Scottish share of whatever policy was going to formulating policy themselves. This 
has required additional resources and policy making capacity, which  have only partially 
been found. Also needed is a change in attitudes, which has been more gradual.  Among 
voluntary groups there was a period of europhoria following devolution, and of high 
expectations. Much was made of a ‘new politics’ in Scotland, with a greater role for 
participation, for social movements and for consensus and less for the parties and the old 
political class. In its more naïve versions, this seemed to postulate a form of non-politics, 
in which consensus would naturally emerge from deliberation and everybody would win. 
The rough reality of politics, in which compromises have to be made and participation 
does not always mean getting one’s way, proved something of a shock. The voluntary 
sector also suffered something of a setback after 2002, with the return to influence of 
Labour’s local government notables, who are competing for the same political ground as 
well as for control over local service delivery. Business groups were initially sceptical 
about devolution and suffered a loss of privileged access in 1997 with the change of 
government and again in 1999. Towards the end of the first parliamentary session, 
however, they started to come back into the Scottish networks as the Executive put more 
emphasis on economic development. There has also been some increase in horizontal 
contact among groups within Scotland to form territorial policy communities in areas like 
economic development, social exclusion or rural policy. By the elections of 2003 there 
was a broad consensus around the economic strategy document Smart, Successful 
Scotland, with its emphasis on the knowledge economy and the need for a social 
dimension to development.  
 
Public Opinion 
Most of the evidence gathered on public opinion in Scotland suggests a similar pattern to 
that in England, although with a small but persistent tendency in Scotland to prefer more 
public service provision, a larger role for the state and more redistribution (CURTICE et 
al., 2002). There is a marked difference in education, with Scottish voters much more 
inclined towards comprehensive schooling (BROMLEY and CURTICE, 2003). These 
differences might be attributed to the distinct class structure within Scotland, and there is 
indeed a larger working class. Closer examination, however, shows that the differences 
among the social classes within Scotland and England  are actually rather small,  but all 
social classes in Scotland are more redistributive than their counterparts in England  
(SURRIDGE, 2003).  More revealing, perhaps,  than people’s objective social class as 
measured by occupation, is subjective self-identification. Scots are more likely than the 
English to describe themselves as working class, irrespective of their objective 
occupational class identity (SURRIDGE, 2003). Those identifying themselves as Scottish 
are also more likely to support redistributive economic policies (PATERSON, 2002). 
Scottish identity seems to have been reconstructed in the 1980s and 1990s around 
opposition to the neo-liberal policies of the Conservative governments of Margaret 
Thatcher and John Major, combining class, communitarian and national symbols and 
references. The resulting mixture is less a matter of precise views on public policy 
matters than a generalized ‘moral economy’ (HEARN, 2000), summed up in the critique 
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of neo-liberal excess, ‘it’s no fair’. So not charging up-front student fees, or providing 
free personal care for the elderly might be considered left-wing, since they are based on 
universal provision, or right-wing, as they benefit better off families most and are 
supported by the Conservative Party.  Both policies, however, tap a sense of shared 
responsibility and community ethos that challenges the neo-liberal and market-driven 
assumptions of much public policy under successive British governments. This extends to 
the professions, where there also seems to be a greater commitment within the public 
sector in Scotland to universal public services.6 Political myths come into play here and 
can be exploited by competing political forces. Margaret Thatcher tried to portray the 
Scottish Enlightenment as a kind of proto-Thatcherism to show that her policies were not 
alien. The left, in its time, made much of legends of Red Clydeside and social struggle. 
What has emerged in recent decades is another reconstruction, in which national identity 
seems to play the role that ideology and class politics might have in the past. This should 
not be exaggerated, but it does provide  a set of themes on which politicians can play, 
adapting their policies and rhetoric to shared assumptions and norms.  
 
Political Parties 
A strong factor for policy uniformity has been the presence in both London and 
Edinburgh of Labour-dominated administrations. It is not that London imposes policy 
from the centre, although UK some politicians do take a lot of interest in what is 
happening in Scotland and discourage innovations, like free personal care for the elderly 
or the abolition of up-front university tuition fees, which might provoke matching 
demands in England. It is more that Labour politicians in both jurisdictions share broadly 
the same ideas and party loyalties. Despite a common stereotype, Scottish Labour Party 
members are not less ‘New Labour’ than their counterparts in England (HASSAN, 2004). 
It is also a matter of strategy. Henry McLeish (First Minister 20001), in his brief tenure, 
was anxious to put a personal stamp on policy, which he did through free personal care 
for the elderly and signing the Declaration of Flanders, with the other ‘constitutional 
regions’ demanding a greater role in Europe (McLEISH, 2004). Jack McConnell (First 
Minister since 2001), on the other hand, has cleaved more closely to London, seeking to 
present a uniform Labour policy set and preventing ministers making any criticisms of 
English or reserved policy matters. This contrasts with Rhodri Morgan, First Minister of 
Wales, who has been unabashed in proclaiming his dissent from aspects of New Labour 
policy and his intention to limit their impact in Wales. Again McConnell’s  calculation 
seems to be that he will get more from playing the loyal partner with London, and that 
any obvious difference would play into the hands of the nationalists. As a result, even 
where Scotland has diverged from England, as on public service delivery, there has been 
no effort to highlight the difference.  
   One contrast with England is the pattern of party competition, across the two key axes: 
the traditional left-right one; and the nationalism axis with its competing Scottish, British 
and European foci. In England, New Labour has faced competition from the right and 
from the British nationalist and Euro-sceptic quarter both embodied in the Conservative 
Party. This is not quite balanced by the Liberal Democrats, who are more libertarian and 
                                                
6 A BMA survey in 2003 showed only 40 per cent of doctors in Scotland in favour of charging for home 
visits, against 58 across the UK (Herald, 29 April 2003). There is evidence of distinct attitudes also among 
Scottish academics (PATERSON, 2003). 
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distinctly more pro-Europe. New political movements in the last few years have been 
even further to the British nationalist right. In Scotland, the only competition Labour 
faces on the right is a weak Conservative Party which is itself rather moderate. 
Competing on its left it has the SNP, the Scottish Socialists, the Greens and, in many 
respects, the Liberal Democrats. On the unionist side it has only the weakened 
Conservative while on its home rule or nationalist flank it faces all four other parties. 
There is no serious Eurosceptic challenge in Scotland. Again, this is not merely a matter 
of the class structure of Scotland. Despite having a monopoly on the right, at the 2001 
election, the Conservatives came third or fourth in every social category, apart from the 
petty bourgeoisie, where they equalled the SNP (BRITISH ELECTION STUDY, 2001). 
They have failed, rather, to rebuild in the 1980s the type of social coalition that had made 
the Conservatives Scotland’s leading party in the 1950s. Nor is the absence of 
Euroscepticism in Scotland simply a reflection of public opinion, since the electors are 
only mildly less Eurosceptic than those in England, and even this does not hold for SNP 
voters. It is a matter of the supply of policies rather than the demand, as both the parties 
and social elites have constructed a link between Scottish home rule and Europe. All this 
has helped frame public debate in Scotland somewhat to the left and to the pro-European 
side of that in England and shaped the policy agenda accordingly. 
   Coalition politics has also affected policy in Scotland. The Liberal Democrats were 
critical in the abolition of up-front tuition fees and free personal care, freedom of 
information and law and order (see below). They are also single-handedly responsible for 
the promise to introduce proportional representation in local government. This is not just 
a policy in itself but one that promises dynamic effects in further increasing political 
competition in Scotland and undermining a key power  base of the old Labour Party.  
 
Policy Capacity 
The Scottish Executive in 1999 took over a substantial administrative machine from the 
old Scottish Office. Yet most Scottish Office departments were not there to make policy 
but to apply it and have had to strengthen their policy capacity, starting from different 
levels. The Executive also inherited a very uneven research base. There was a substantial 
effort in housing and education and an agricultural research budget out of all proportion 
to Scotland’s share of UK agriculture, but big gaps in other fields. Some new capacity 
has developed within departments since 1999, but it does not always seem sensible 
simply to duplicate what is being done in Whitehall if there is no demand for a distinct 
policy. Research has been rationalized with a stronger central research department.  In 
2004 a new Permanent Secretary reorganized the Executive to provide a stronger policy 
focus at the centre. The size of the Scottish system, however, precludes anything as 
powerful as the Treasury has been in recent years within Whitehall. Policy ideas also 
come through local government practice, through agencies, and from interest groups. 
Departments, however, still lack the knowledge base that would allow them to redefine 
issues and problems.  
  Much innovation in UK government has come recently from the various policy units at 
10 Downing Street and from the Treasury, and the Scottish Executive is involved in these 
initiatives and experiments (PARRY, 2001). These initiatives, however, tend to be ad hoc 
and to involve new ideas rather than mainstream policy. There are no Public Service 
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Agreements in Scotland, so that the Scottish Executive is outside the new centralism 
imposed by the Treasury on Whitehall and is able to got is own way. 7 
    Scotland does not have the range of think tanks that have been so influential in British 
government in recent decades, although there has been some expansion. This has left the 
field to neo-liberal and New Labour think tanks to export ideas from England. The 
ideological hegemony is these ideas has often left Scottish policy-makers on the 
defensive, unable to articulate an alternative even when, as with public service delivery, 
there are practising it.  
 
Finance 
Scotland’s financial settlement is unusual in international comparison, since it combines a 
transfer accounting for the whole of the Executive’s own spending with complete 
freedom of allocation. What is also unusual is that changes in the block each year are 
calculated by reference to functional allocations for England, but that these have no 
binding affect on the functional allocations once the money comes to Scotland. It might 
be expected that  interest groups would be alert to this, and insist on parity with England. 
8 There is a little evidence for this. In 2001, for example, the Chancellor announced 
additional money for health in England, between spending rounds. The Scottish  
Executive felt obliged to pledge that the Scottish share generated under the Barnett 
formula would also go to health; but later noted that this did not necessarily mean the 
same priorities within health. It is not, however, possible for groups to demand this kind 
of matching across the range of public services, since the information does not exist to 
make the comparisons. In the first place, the functional headings in the Scottish budget 
are different. Second, reporting practices differ.9 Third, a great deal of expenditure is 
passed on to local government and this is no longer reported under functional headings, 
merely as a local government block. Scotland is thus forced to decide its own priorities 
and cannot fall back on English choices as a default option.  
   Block funding does, however, constrain Scottish discretion in other ways.  As the 
Scottish Executive does not have borrowing power, it would be forced to use the Private 
Finance Initiative for capital projects even if it did not want to, or try to fund them all out 
of current revenue (the Welsh Assembly Government, opposed to PFI, has this problem). 
Block funding also prevents Scotland from making a choice between low taxation and 
high spending, a key issue in any modern democracy, or between financing services from 
fees or taxes. Already, the Scottish Parliament has opted for free personal care for the 
elderly and to abolish up-front university tuition fees. The problem is exacerbated as the 
government proposes to finance English universities partly from fees, a policy rejected by 
the Scottish Executive. Should a future UK government introduce fees more widely, for 
example in health, this question could become acute. Conservative Party proposals to 
provide tax relief for private health care instead of increasing spending on the National 
                                                
7 I do not agree with the idea of ADAMS AND ROBINSON (2002) that the Treasury has become the new 
centre for UK domestic policy including the devolved administrations.  
8 Strict parity would mean the application of the ‘Barnett consequentials’ to Scotland. This would provide 
cash increases per capita for each service equal to England. It would not mean the same percentage 
increase, because of the historically higher levels in Scotland.  
9 Expenditure plans are reported Sometimes as ‘departmental expenditure limits’ and sometimes as ‘annual 
managed expenditure’ (including items outside the Barnett block). They are not consistently reported in the 
same form in the English and the Scottish documents.  
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Health Service (NHS), would reduce the prospective transfers to the Scottish Parliament. 
Given the distribution of public and political opinion in Scotland, it is inconceivable that, 
left to their own devices, Scots would opt for this mode of provision but, if England led 
they would have to follow.  
 
Divergence in Practice 
At the start of this paper, I indicated that policy divergence under devolution was 
constrained by contextual and political factors. There was scope, however, for shaping 
the way in which policy was delivered and that this was greater than under the old 
Scottish Office. As I also indicated, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between differences 
in policy and differences in emphasis and priorities. There is pressure for divergence 
from party competition and from emerging Scottish policy communities.  On the other 
hand, the UK departments remain a powerful force of policy ideas, UK policy 
communities are strong, the policy agenda is often set at the centre and there is a 
consequent policy drag from England.   
   The greatest policy divergence concerns modes of public service delivery. New Labour 
in both Scotland and England is committed to the welfare state and services largely free 
at the point of use, and both have been influenced by New Public Management ideas. 
Labour in England, however, has moved furthest away from the ideal of uniform, public 
provided services towards differentiation, internal markets and mixed models of service 
delivery. This is partly a response to the different challenges facing social democracy in 
the two jurisdictions. In England, faced with a drift of the middle classes to private health 
and education, New Labour has sought to provide them with their own niche within the 
welfare state. In Scotland the challenge is less acute.10 It also reflects the pattern of public 
opinion in Scotland, although it would be a mistake to read public policy directly from 
mass opinion. Rather party competition and the structure of policy communities in 
Scotland have sustained a consensus around these themes, drawing on public opinion and 
shaping it in turn. The difference was apparent in the health service from an early stage 
(WOODS, 2002; GREER, 2004). Scotland has not reintroduced internal market elements 
as in England, and there are no star ratings or foundation hospitals. Scotland has placed 
more emphasis on local government as a service provider and less on the voluntary 
sector. There is an explicit commitment to comprehensive education, largely abandoned 
in England and there are no school league tables in Scotland. All parties in the Scottish 
Parliament have rejected top-up fees for universities, and there is no move to create elite 
universities or concentrate all the research funding in a few institutions. 
   Scotland has also been less inclined to ‘targetry’, the setting of detailed targets for bits 
of public services, a practice long criticized for giving perverse incentives. It is not that 
the Scottish Executive does not have targets, but they are less in number and less 
detailed. One reason for this is no doubt the inability of the Treasury to impose Public 
Service Agreements on Scottish departments. These have led to a marked centralization 
of policy making in England, both horizontally, across government departments, and 
vertically, as local governments and the regional development agencies are also drawn in. 
In the absence of devolution, the Scottish Office would also have been part of this 
                                                
10 Private health care covers a tenth of the Scottish population but a quarter in south of England. 3.4 per 
cent of Scottish children are in private schools, against 10.8 per cent in south east England.  
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process, so that if we compare devolved government not just with what when before but 
with what would have happened in its absence, it is clear that it has made a difference.  
   Policy style has also differed in Scotland. There was a great deal of consultation in the 
first session, in line with commitments made before devolution, although this generated a 
certain frustration and weariness among the consultees. Policy making is more 
deliberative, with less of a tendency to claim to know all the answers and more 
willingness to explore issues. The reasons for this are various, including the commitment 
at the outset of devolution to a more inclusive style, and the role of the committees in the 
Scottish Parliament. Another factor is that the weakness of policy capacity in the Scottish 
Executive departments forces them to rely more on the broader policy networks. For the 
same reason there has been less centralization, with local government and agencies in 
areas like health, higher education or economic development given greater scope.  The 
resulting style sometimes comes across as a vagueness of objectives or a lack of strategic 
direction. It is variously praised as ‘new politics’ and ‘stakeholder involvement’, or 
criticized, especially from the New Labour perspective, as pandering to ‘producer 
interests’ (HASSAN and WARHURST, 2002) but it is certainly distinct. This has meant 
that even although the policy agenda in Scotland is very similar to that in England, some 
issues, such as social inclusion, economic development or rural policy, have been framed 
rather differently and that policy linkages have been rather distinctive. For example, in 
securing wider access to higher education, the Scottish approach has been to work at a 
number of levels while seeking to learn more about the obstacles to inclusion, in contrast 
to the English intention to set targets and police them through a centralized ‘access 
regulator’. The linkage between higher education institutions and economic development 
is being developed in a different way, although the basic idea has now come on to the 
regional development agenda in England.  
   Another broad difference concerns law and order. Care has been taken to ensure that 
criminals cannot take advantages of lacunae in Scottish and English law, sometimes with 
Sewel resolutions11 allowing Westminster to seal the gaps. On the other hand, on matters 
of criminal procedure and law, Scotland has been less authoritarian than England under 
Home Secretaries Jack Straw and David Blunkett. Coalition politics was largely 
responsible here, as the Justice Portfolio was held by Jim Wallace of the Liberal 
Democrats, who clashed with Jack McConnell during the 2003 election campaign over 
proposals to gaol parents of delinquent children.12 In the coalition agreement after the 
election, the proposal was watered down almost out of existence. Labour did, however, 
take the portfolio after the election and a series of populist measures was brought 
forward.  
   European constraints are well illustrated by two issues agriculture, the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with its moves from production subsidies; and the 
issue of genetically-modified (GM) crops. In the first phase of CAP reform under Agenda 
2000 the Scottish Executive sided with Scottish farmers who were not keen on 
‘modulation’ the reduction of production payments and their diversion into rural 
development measures. Variation was allowed at the Member State level but not within, 
                                                
11 This is a provision whereby the Scottish Parliament can ask Westminster to legislate in devolved matters 
(CAIRNEY and KEATING, 2004).  
12 Henry McLeish also complained that the Liberal Democrats were too soft on law and order (McLEISH, 
2004).  
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so the UK departments needed to agree. Eventually, Scotland went along with 
modulation but on condition that the Treasury provided the necessary matching funding 
directly.13 It then passed the modulated payments largely back to the farmers. In the 2003 
reform round, it succeeded in getting the right to apply modulation as well as the new 
‘decoupling’ arrangements differently in Scotland. The result was a rather different 
decoupling regime in Scotland, but within the limits of European policy. On GM crops, 
there was a significant divergence, given the widespread opposition to GM in the Scottish 
Parliament. Yet a unified policy was necessary for the United Kingdom, all parts of 
which need to agree on placing items on the national seed list. Given the political 
impossibility of Scotland vetoing GM crops for the whole UK, the Scottish Executive in 
2004 announced that it would go along with GM planting but called for a voluntary 
moratorium by Scottish farmers. These two issues show how the Scottish Executive can 
be caught between European and UK requirements and political opinion in Scotland, with 
little room for manoeuvre.  
   More attention, however, has been given to three explicit departures from English 
policy. One was the decision to implement the recommendations of the Sutherland 
Report on free personal care for the elderly. This caused considerable problems with 
London because of the precedent it set, and for breaking with the uniform welfare state 
provisions that had hitherto prevailed. In practice, the difference with England  may not 
be as great as trumpeted, since it all comes to down to exactly how much money is 
available to provide precisely which services to whom. A second issue was the decision 
on university tuition fees. Again the difference is muted since the fees were not abolished 
but postponed until after graduation; a much bigger challenge will be posed by the £3000 
top-up fees now proposed in England, which Scotland has explicitly rejected in the 
coalition agreement of 2003. In both cases, policy divergence was limited by the funding 
formula since Scotland cannot choose to fund services from taxation rather than charges; 
a compromise had to be found that was affordable within existing budgetary constraints. 
The third issue is Freedom of Information, where Liberal Democrat control of the 
relevant  portfolio ensured a somewhat more liberal law. The differences are small but 
significant, the most important  hinging on a difference  between a test of ‘prejudice in 
England and ‘seriously prejudice’ in Scotland and whether the minister has the last say on 
whether information can be withheld in all circumstances. Ministerial and civil service 
pressure, on the other hand, watered down the Scottish as well as the UK legislation.   
  A final set of policies concerns matters with no equivalent in England and here Scotland 
has been able to proceed on its own. The most important was the Land Reform Act, 
fulfilling historic ambitions of the Labour and Liberal Parties. Land reform had been held 
up in the past not by England but by the weight of landowners within Scotland and their 
links into the old system. It is thus an example of power shifting within Scotland 
following devolution. Even with a sympathetic Labour government in London, it is 
unlikely that such a large and complex bill could have gained time at Westminster or 
have survived guerrilla tactics in the Commons and the Lords.  
 
                                                
13 If the money had gone through the Barnett formula, Scotland would have gained less.  
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Conclusion 
Policy making in modern government is often an incremental process, punctuated by bold 
initiatives. Policy-making in devolved and federal systems is further constrained by 
complex patterns of intergovernmental relations and interdependencies. The policy 
agenda in Scotland is not greatly distinct from that in England, or indeed other parts of 
Europe, with a few exceptions such as land reform. There is some variation at the level of 
policy framing, which itself often stems from the distinct policy style and the need in 
Scotland to negotiate policy with a range of groups of different political weights. This has 
produced a slow but persistent trend to divergence in public policy most notable in 
service provision where Scotland (and Wales) retain the traditional social democratic 
model linked to the public service professions. It may be that England is diverging from 
Scotland rather than the other way around, but divergence is certainly there. The use of 
distinct instruments, the final level of divergence identified earlier, is not new, but has 
increased since devolution. These forms of divergence have so far not presented a 
challenge to the devolution settlement itself, but if England continues to move in the 
direction of charging for public services or using distinct financial instruments such as 
foundation hospitals with the ability to borrow on the market, then the question of fiscal 
autonomy for Scotland, already subject to considerable debate, will become more urgent.  
   There have been few radical initiatives in Scotland, and the present administration 
seems to disinclined to produce many. Labour in England and Scotland is committed to 
much the same priorities of economic growth tempered by social inclusion.There were 
suggestions in 2004 that Jack McConnell was seeking to bring the Scottish Labour Party 
more in line with that of New Labour in England on matters of public service reform. 
Already in the second session  there were signs of a  more confrontational style, as 
ministers started attacking ‘vested interests’ in the legal profession and elsewhere. so we 
will have to await a change of government to look for dramatic divergence.   
  On the other hand, devolution here as elsewhere can provide laboratories for innovation 
on individual policy items. Intergovernmental influence has not all been one way. There 
has been a degree of innovation within the devolved governments, some of which has 
been imitated by others. The idea of a Childrens’s Commissioner, pioneered in Wales, 
was extended first to Scotland and then to England. The Scottish system of postponed 
payment is being adopted for the English university top-up fees.  So devolution may 
promote not just divergence or convergence but cycles of innovation,  in which 
innovation produces divergence, followed by reconvergence on the new idea. 
 
This paper is based on research supported by ESRC grant L219 25 2020 under the 
programme on Devolution and Constitutional Change. A fuller treatment is given in 
KEATING (2005). 
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